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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the United States, professional and amateur sports “generate an
insatiable interest in sports and the players themselves.”2 More than ever,
prominent companies as well as individual consumers are investing substantial
time and money into the enjoyment of their favorite games. As the sports culture
grows in America, so do “opportunities for emerging and lucrative markets for
sports-themed products.”3 One such prospect is the ever-growing market for sports
simulation games.4 However, through fan participation in fantasy sports leagues
and sports video games arises a great public interest in athlete identity, specifically
determining the “appropriate boundaries for players’ publicity rights against the
right of commerce and the interests of the public under the First Amendment.”5
When the use of an individual’s identity has commercial value, that individual
should have the exclusive right to control the use of that identity and should be
fairly compensated for such a use. The right of publicity operates to protect an
individual from this form of exploitation when use of his or her image is lacking
the requisite compensation and/or consent. Naturally, in order to profit from the
commercial exploitation of an individual’s identity, that identity must have
acquired some level of value already.6 Given that celebrities are the “principal
parties who have value in their names and likeness,” these figures are
exceptionally prone to violations of their publicity rights.7 However, in a recent
third circuit holding,8 the court extended this protection to a former college athlete,
who arguably may not possess celebrity status in the traditional sense but has still
worked to bring value to his name and likeness. As technology and media avenues
advance, courts will likely be forced to assess many cases analogous to this in the
not-so-distant future.
Balancing the right of publicity against the interest of free expression under
the First Amendment remains a challenge for American court systems, which
place great value on both securities. Where the First Amendment prevents the
suppression of speech, the right of publicity halts speech that takes advantage of
another individual’s interest in his or her personal identity.9 Accordingly, both
interests must be equalized so that valuable speech is not suppressed, but an
individual’s identity is not exploited without his or her consent or due
compensation.

2
Maureen Weston, The Fantasy of Athlete Publicity Rights: Public Fascination and Fantasy Sports’
Assertion of Free Use Place Athlete Publicity Rights on an Uncertain Playing Field, 11 CHAP. L. REV.
581, 582 (2008).
3
Id. at 589.
4
See James Montague, The Rise and Rise of Fantasy Sports, CNN (Jan. 20, 2010),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/SPORT/football/01/06/fantasy.football.moneyball.sabermetrics/.
5
Weston, supra note 2, at 582.
6
DONALD E. BIEDERMAN, ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRIES 210 (5th
ed. 2007).
7
Id.
8
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). See infra Section II.
9
See Mark Bartholomew & John Tehranian, An Intersystemic View of Intellectual Property and Free
Speech, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013).
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While courts have most recently employed the transformative use test to
balance these privileges, it is highly unlikely such a flexible test will continue to
rule right of publicity decision-making processes. Courts should be increasingly
concerned with the economic harm caused by misappropriation, and should look
to intellectual property law standards which could provide more accurate and
comprehensive procedures for balancing both rights.
II. THE RYAN HART CASE
In 2007, nearly 49 million spectators were recorded attending college football
games across the nation.10 In a successful attempt to capitalize on the college
football frenzy, Electronic Arts, Inc. created NCAA Football 2006. While the
company previously created National Football League simulation games, NCAA
Football 2006 allowed players to simulate the full college football experience,
including stadiums, mascots, and players.11 The virtual-reality-based game
allowed each player to manipulate the actions of more than 100 college football
teams to create his or her ideal fantasy matchup.12
Today, Ryan Hart works as a professional in the financial services industry.13
However, from 2002 until 2005, he held the position of quarterback for the
Rutgers football team.14 Despite Hart’s current absence from any organized
football team, his legacy on the field lives on, alongside thousands of other
athletes, in the aforementioned NCAA Football simulation video game.15 An
unnamed avatar that shares Hart’s jersey number, height, weight, biography, and
playing statistics appears as a possible selection for players in the virtual reality
game.16 Furthermore, the player statistics also listed Hart’s home state, hometown,
college team name, and graduating year.17 It is certain that such attention to detail
by Electronic Arts was done in desire to simulate a realistic gaming experience by
allowing fans to control the moves of digital copies of their favorite players, as
there is no question that the NCAA franchise relies on realism and detail for its
success.18 In response to the comparable avatar present in game, Hart argued that
Electronic Arts’ use of his image went too far and took advantage of his persona
for commercial gain.19

10
Bryan Curtis, The National Pastime(s), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/02/01/weekinreview/01curtis.html?_r=0.
11
Hart, 717 F.3d at 146.
12
Adam Liptak, When It May Not Pay to be Famous, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/sunday-review/between-the-first-amendment-and-right-ofpublicity.html?_r=0.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2013).
18
Ronald S. Katz, When Rights of Publicity Trump 1st Amendment, LAW360 (May 22, 2013),
https://www.law360.com/articles/444030/when-rights-of-publicity-trump-1st-amendment.
19
Hart, 717 F.3d at 147.
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Hart sued the game’s manufacturer, Electronic Arts, stating the company
should have requested his permission in use of his identical likeness, and also
commented that a licensing agreement for such use should have been offered.20
However, Electronic Arts argued that Hart’s amateur status, which allowed him to
play at the collegiate level, barred him from receiving any form of payment or
licensing agreement the company would have offered him.21 In the United States
District Court, summary judgment was granted in favor of Electronic Arts on the
ground that NCAA Football was “shielded from right of publicity claims by the
First Amendment.”22 However, on appeal, the Third Circuit ultimately sided with
Hart.23
The Third Circuit acknowledged that courts employ various balancing
approaches in addressing the right of publicity against First Amendment
guarantees.24 Ultimately the court accepted use of the transformative use test,
where a balance is sought to be struck between a celebrity’s right to profit from his
image and the value of the new expressive work by considering “the purpose and
character of the use.”25 In applying the test to this case, the majority concluded that
the avatar too closely mirrored Ryan Hart, and that the simulated game did not
“alter or transform the player’s identity in a significant way.”26 The court further
stated, “[d]ecisions applying the transformative use test invariably look to how the
celebrity’s identity is used in, or is altered by, other aspects of the work.”27 The
majority opinion primarily focused on the image of Ryan Hart, looking only at the
present similarities between the player himself and the avatar present in the video
game.

20
It is important to note that in 2011, the United States Supreme Court did hold video games deserving
of full First Amendment protection. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011). See
also Liptak, supra note 12.
21
Hart, 717 F.3d at 146.
22
Id. at 147.
23
Id. at 145.
24
See infra Section V(b).
25
Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001).
26
Hart, 717 F.3d at 166.
27
Id. at 169.

[87: 91]

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

91

Leading up the Court’s decision, The Screen Actors Guild and several
different players’ unions filed amicus briefs in support of Hart, suggesting that
athletes, actors, and other celebrities must be allotted the right to control the use of
their identities and to financially reap the benefits of their fame.28 Conversely,
advocates in the movie industry, book publishers, and news organizations argued
publicly that allowing celebrities to control speech concerning their own public
images directly disregarded principles held in the First Amendment.29 In a
statement on behalf of Electronic Arts, the company’s lawyer, Jake Schatz,
indicated the importance of this case as future legal precedent in saying, “[t]he
reach of this decision extends far beyond video games. If it stands, all creators of
expressive works that depict real individuals, including filmmakers, biographers
and journalists, would face a stark choice: liability or self-censorship.”30 While the
court ultimately sided with Hart, this decision did set precedent in future right of
publicity cases in the Third Circuit in its decision to utilize the transformative use
test. Of greater importance is the likelihood that the Hart case will serve as a
catalyst for courts to recognize the need for a more cohesive balancing test. There
is a strong possibility that media surrounding the Hart case will result in added
pressure for the Supreme Court to consider taking on modern right of publicity
cases in an attempt to create a more applicable standard for the future.
III. DEFINING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity is in place to protect each individual’s right to the
exclusive commercial use of his or her own name and likeness.31 This guarantee
seeks to protect each individual from the exploitation of that individual’s fame or
notoriety without his or her consent.32
In 1960, William Prosser authored an article that is widely viewed as the
stimulus to the creation of the right of publicity.33 In his findings, Prosser divided
the right of privacy into four distinctive categories.34 While the first three
categories have not created substantive legal appreciation, the fourth category has.
This category, which he referred to as the “appropriation” of the plaintiff’s name
or likeness for commercial purposes, has since developed into the right of
publicity doctrine.35 Legal recognition for the right itself also finds significant
support in the tort of “invasion of privacy by appropriation,” which provides that
an individual’s likeness, image, or identity cannot be used by another without
express authorization.36 In short, the right of publicity grants each individual a
property interest in his or her own identity.37
28

Liptak, supra note 12.
Id.
30
Id.
31
See Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2009).
32
Hart, 717 F.3d at 151.
33
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
34
See generally id.
35
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 571–72 (1977) (citing William
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960)).
36
Hart, 717 F.3d at 150 (citing J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
§1:23 (2d ed. 2012)).
37
Hart, 717 F.3d at 150 (quoting Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 64 A. 392, 394 (N.J. Ch.
1907)).
29
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The application of the right of publicity is broad,38 and while celebrities
typically exercise the right, it is available to all individuals.39 Multiple rationales
support the right of publicity’s protection of an individual’s interest in his or her
own identity.40 Many rationales have a moral basis, in that our society tends to
disapprove of attempts to ride on the coattails of another’s “time, effort, skill, and
even money.”41 Meanwhile, there are economic rationales to keep in mind as well.
Such arguments focus on incentivizing individuals to “expend the time, effort and
resources necessary to develop talents and produce works that ultimately benefit
society as a whole.”42 In a related concern, the right of publicity also works to
protect consumers from advertisers who falsely present their product as being
endorsed by a particular individual.43
IV. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
While few courts have expressly addressed the issue, the right of publicity
often conflicts with the First Amendment.44 Frequently, free speech is raised as an
affirmative defense in right of publicity lawsuits.45 Given that the First
Amendment protects speech from proscription by the government, yet protection
is granted through the right of publicity, the government allows certain
suppression of one individual’s speech in order to protect the rights of another.46
The tension that exists between the two rights creates conflict, often resulting in
legal action by the individual. The balance between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment has to be carefully considered because “the very importance of
celebrities in society means that the right of publicity has the potential of
censoring significant expression by suppressing alternative versions of celebrity
images that are iconoclastic, irrelevant or otherwise attempt to redefine the
celebrity’s meaning.”47

38
K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property Expansion: The Good, The Bad, and the Right of Publicity, 11
CHAP. L. REV. 521, 536–38 (2008).
39
Id.
40
Such rationales may include: (1) a judgment of moral disapproval for the appropriation of another’s
efforts, (2) an interest in the economic effort, and (3) an interest in protecting consumers from false
advertisements of endorsement. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the First
Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 54 (1994).
41
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (“No social purpose is
served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and
for which he would normally pay.”).
42
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 125, 206 (1993).
43
Id. at 231–32.
44
See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001) (stating that
“[a]lthough surprisingly few courts have considered in any depth the means of reconciling the right of
publicity and the First Amendment, we follow those that have in concluding that depictions of
celebrities amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity’s economic value are not
protected expression under the First Amendment.”).
45
See e.g., Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 810; Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003).
46
Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 5
(2002).
47
Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 803.
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Video games and other related media are unambiguously defined “speech”
within the meaning of the First Amendment.48 In 2011, the Supreme Court
expressly concluded that video games are protected within the bounds of the First
Amendment as they “communicate ideas—and even social messages—through
many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and music), and
through features distinctive to the medium (such as the player’s interaction with
the virtual world).”49 Since it is established that the NCAA video game is a work
that is deemed to be “speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment, the
next step is to determine how to balance the protection afforded by that
Amendment against competing interests.50
While it may appear that such a balancing test should be easily ascertainable,
the context in which an individual claims that his right of publicity has been
infringed can change the analysis. As the nature of alleged infringement in right of
publicity cases has evolved over time, courts have differed in the scope in which
they categorize types of commercial use, and in turn whether or not certain alleged
infringers have a valid First Amendment defense.51 The development of sportsrelated games through advancements in technology, as seen in the Hart case,52 and
court determinations as to the alleged “exploitation” of publicity rights illustrate
the inconsistent application of the right of publicity doctrine and First Amendment
jurisprudence.53 Furthermore, these cases lend valid support to the argument that
the time has come for the U.S. Supreme Court to develop an instructive standard
for courts to consistently apply to right of publicity cases that also implicate First
Amendment considerations.54

48

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011).
Id.
50
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013).
51
Richard Karcher, The Use of Players’ Identities in Fantasy Sports Leagues: Developing Workable
Standards for Right of Publicity Claims, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 557, 560, 566 (2007).
52
Supra Section II.
53
Timothy J. Bucher, Game On: Sports-Related Games and Contentious Interplay Between the Right of
Publicity and the First Amendment, 14 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 2 (2012).
54
Id.
49
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V. CURRENT MEASUREMENTS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
a.

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.

In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the United States
Supreme Court first explicitly examined the intersection of the First Amendment
and right of publicity.55 Not only was this case the first examination of right of
publicity doctrine by the Supreme Court, it was also the last. Zacchini, a selfproclaimed “human cannonball,” filed suit against the broadcasting company that
aired the entirety of his performance at a local county fair.56 The Court ruled that
the network had violated Zacchini’s right of publicity,57 and more specifically
found that the goal of the right of publicity is “analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law” in that such protections should serve to protect an individual’s
ability to “reap the reward of his endeavors.”58 Based on the facts presented in
Zacchini, the Court held that the news broadcast deprived Zacchini of the
economic value of his performance, since allowing viewers to see the performance
for free would likely drive downwards the number of viewers willing to pay for
the same viewing experience.59 As a matter of strict legal precedent, Zacchini
remains the only guiding principle for lower courts in considering right of
publicity cases. However, not all courts embrace and follow its holding.60 Over
time, state and federal courts have developed inconsistent standards, which have
created a wide discrepancy in how right of publicity cases are decided.61

55

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Id. at 563.
57
Id. at 565–66.
58
Id. at 573.
59
Id. at 575–76.
60
See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 970 (10th Cir.
1996).
61
Mark Conrad, The Right of Publicity in the Digital Age-Doctrinal Tensions, Common Law Theories
and Proposals for Solutions, 24 COMPUTER LAW & SECURITY REPORT 407, 4014–16 (2008).
56
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While discussion of Zacchini is pivotal in any examination of the right of
publicity, it is important to address two main points. First, the case presented was
not commercial in nature; the disputed footage was presented as part of a local
newscast.62 So, while the court did address the economic harm Zacchini faced, this
harm was substantially less than is present in most modern right of publicity cases.
Second, in its holding the Court failed to establish any specific test or standard to
implement in future right of publicity cases, instead it relied upon a copyright law
analysis of the facts.63 As right of publicity claims have increased, due to
advancements in technology and increase in media coverage, courts have been
faced with “a more compelling and difficult issue” of exacting a balance between
the right of publicity and the First Amendment.64 In response, post-Zacchini courts
have pieced together three different balancing tests in an attempt to find
appropriate boundaries between the right of publicity and the First Amendment.65
b.

Modern Tests

Under the predominant purpose test, an unauthorized use of another’s
identity is protected if the purpose of the work is predominantly expressive.66 This
also means that when the predominant purpose of the product is to make an
expressive comment about the individual, the expressive values of the speech are
given greater weight in the decision-making process.67 Conversely, in such cases
the same use is an infringement of the right of publicity if the purpose of the work
is predominantly commercial.68 In the Hart case, the Third Circuit rejected this
test, suggesting it was “subjective at best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case
calls upon judges to act as both impartial jurists and discerning art critics.”69 Many
other courts have come to the same conclusion, in stating that the predominant
purpose test does not provide enough guidance for determining what
“predominant” means.70 Additionally, it does not prove helpful in cases where a
work is intended to make an expressive comment but still results in a direct
imitation of a celebrity’s image.71

62

Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
Id.
64
Conrad, supra note 61, at 407.
65
A few courts have utilized an ad hoc approach, which balances the consequences of restricting a
defendant’s freedom of expression against the justifications for a plaintiff’s right of publicity. However,
this balancing test is most often used in conjunction alongside one of the other well-established tests, as
an element of the decision-making process. See Cardtoons L.C., 182 F.3d at 972.
66
Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
67
Katz, supra note 18.
68
Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374.
69
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013).
70
Joseph Gutmann, It’s in the Game: Redefining the Transformative Use Test for the Video Game
Arena, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 220 (2012).
71
Id.
63
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The relatedness test, often referred to as the Rogers Test,72 does permit
“the right of publicity to bar the use of a celebrity’s name in a title unless the title
was ‘wholly unrelated’ to the movie or was ‘simply disguised commercial
advertisement for the sale of goods or services.’”73 In essence, the relatedness test
creates a two-prong assessment to determine if the commercial speech is protected
under the First Amendment. The first prong states that the title of the work is
unprotected if it has no artistic relevance to the original work.74 The second prong
states that even if relevance exists under the first prong limitation, there is still no
protection if the work in question “explicitly misleads as to the source or the
content of the work.”75
The relatedness test may appear inapplicable on its face, given that Hart’s
name did not appear in the title of the video game at issue; however, some courts
have applied the Rogers test beyond the title of a specific work.76 In the Hart case,
the Third Circuit rejected this test as a “blunt instrument, unfit for widespread
application in cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two
fundamental protections: the right of free expression and the right to control,
manage, and profit from one’s own identity.”77 Many courts have rejected this test
on similar reasoning, in that it is somewhat unfaithful to the principles of the right
of publicity doctrine. As one legal authority stated, “[a] work can be a complete
imitation even if there is no explicit deception in it. These works, despite having
little to no redeeming creative value on their own would still unquestionably pass
the Rogers [relatedness] test.”78 Additionally, similar to objections over the
predominant use test, the necessary judgment of creative relevance concerning any
given work is far too subjective a measurement to create cohesive standards.

72

This nickname is derived from the Second Circuit case where it was first implemented. In Rogers v.
Grimaldi, famous dancer Ginger Rogers filed suit against the producers of a movie that featured
characters that imitated Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire. The main characters of the film were Italian
dancers who shared the American stars’ identical first names. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d
Cir. 1989).
73
Id. at 996.
74
Id. at 999 (“In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a celebrity’s name, that balance will
normally not support application of the Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying
work whatsoever.”).
75
Id.
76
Katz, supra note 18.
77
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 2013).
78
Guttmann, supra note 70, at 220.
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As earlier mentioned, in the Hart case the Third Circuit decided that the
transformative use test was the best means for balancing the right of publicity
against First Amendment rights in a video game context. Under the transformative
use test, a work that depicts a celebrity enjoys First Amendment protection if it is
the artist’s creative expression rather than merely an imitation of the celebrity’s
likeness at issue.79 More specifically, the Court defined this test as turning on
“[w]hether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity
is the very sum and substance of the work in question.”80 In other words, courts
are asked to consider whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so
transformed that it has become “primarily the defendant’s own expression rather
than the celebrity’s likeness.”81 Many jurisdictions have used this test in right of
publicity determinations. In doing so, it is important to clarify that in each case the
term “expression” denotes an expression of something other than the likeness of
the celebrity.82 While the transformative use test has been successfully utilized in
many right of publicity cases, it too relies upon somewhat murky guidelines for
application. If courts wish to continue use of this test, they will need to develop
more definite standards that more fully appreciate the economic harm that can
result during right of publicity cases.
VI. WHAT STANDARDS COULD BE ENACTED TO BALANCE THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY AGAINST FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION GUARANTEES IN THE
FIRST AMENDMENT?
Since the beginning of right of publicity jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
noted that the right of publicity was a property right similar in nature to other
intellectual property rights.83 In Zacchini, the Court explicitly found that the goals
of the right of publicity doctrine are “analogous to the goals of patent and
copyright law” in that they serve to protect an individual’s ability to “reap the
reward of his endeavors.”84 In a dissenting opinion in the Hart case, Judge Ambro
stated that the “transformative use [test] must mesh with existing constitutional
protections for works of expression.”85 Settling on the transformative use test, the
majority in the Hart case applied a narrow interpretation to the requirement of
transformation in its conclusion that the First Amendment did not protect the
defendant from a violation of his right of publicity.86 However, this conclusion
appears to fall in line with the intellectual property law balancing tests, which
weigh both free expression interests and economic property protection interests.87
The interpretation of the transformative use test should mirror balancing acts
undertaken in the copyright and trademark context, as they are protecting the same
interests.
79

Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808–809 (Cal. 2001).
Id.
81
Guttmann, supra note 70, at 220.
82
Katz, supra note 18.
83
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573 (1977).
84
Id. See also supra Section V(a).
85
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J., dissenting).
86
Id. at 169.
87
Id. at 159.
80
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American copyright laws are aimed at promoting both the creation and
publication of expression.88 As stated in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court has
clarified that “by establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression,
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”89
Similar to the right of publicity, the tension between the First Amendment and
copyright law has long been discussed in the American legal system. The Supreme
Court has determined that this tension may be eased through application of the
idea versus expression dichotomy and the fair use defense.90 The idea versus
expression dichotomy mandates that the “idea” which gives rise to the fixed work
will remain in the public domain, while the “expression” produced from the idea
may be protected by copyright.91 Conversely, the fair use defense92 guides courts,
by way of a series of required elements, in determining whether use of a
previously protected expression is an infringement on that expression.93
The transformative use test is recognizably derived from copyright’s fair
use defense.94 Accordingly, it is fair to state the interests and incentives outlined in
copyright law protections should also be reflected in the treatment of right of
publicity conflicts. The underlying incentive of the right of publicity doctrine is to
provide an individual with the opportunity to make “the investment required to
produce a performance of interest to the public.”95 A paralleling interest underlies
copyright law principles, which work to promote the creation and publication of
free expression by establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s creative
expression.96 Given both sets of laws strive to protect the same basic privileges
regarding potential use of expression for a commercial nature and economic gain,
the interpretation of the transformative use test should mirror the evaluations
utilized in copyright cases.97
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Similar in nature to copyright law, trademark law also strives to promote
economic efficiency in the marketplace through elimination of consumer
confusion. Trademark law also requires consideration of the distinction between
noncommercial and commercial channels of speech.98 Trademark law emphasizes
commercial concerns through its protection of business identity as the origin of
any good or service.99 Viewing a specific mark to determine ownership is no
different than differentiating a source of content by focusing on the specific use of
a celebrity image.100 In right of publicity cases, the origin would not be a
company, but the individual at issue instead. Therefore, in theory, courts would be
asked to consider whether use of any given celebrity image in a new work is so
recognizable as to cause audience members to believe that the individual is
connected to the new work. Direct consideration of the economic interests, as
trademark law allows, would help guarantee that the application of the
transformative use test clearly addressed the economic interests which are often
overlooked in right of publicity decision making processes.
Is there likely a balancing test that would successfully evaluate all right
of publicity claims? Given the factual specificity of these cases, probably not.
However, it is certain that both fair use considerations and potential economic
harms should be evaluated to determine whether an individual’s right of publicity
has been infringed upon. Courts should be working to implement a fair use
standard, consisting of a set of well-defined elements, to first evaluate whether an
individual’s identity has been used unfairly. Furthermore, while reasoning was
outlined earlier101 dismissing the effectiveness of the relatedness test, it should not
be discounted in its entirety. It appears that courts tend to discredit this standard
primarily due to the highly specific and generally inapplicable nature of the first
requirement for an artistic relationship between the title of the work and the
identity being misused. However, in mandating that consumers cannot be misled
as to the source of the content of the work in question, the second part of this
analysis process mirrors goals of intellectual property consistently. By merging the
fair use doctrine with the economic protections of the relatedness tests, courts
would be far more successful in evaluating right of publicity cases in their entirety.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The right of publicity doctrine significantly constrains the dissemination
of ideas and information by placing limits on who can use celebrity images, and in
what context. While the American court system has noted the tension between the
First Amendment and the right of publicity, our system is still lacking a consistent
method for resolving conflict between the two theories of law. In order to maintain
the right of publicity while still protecting the First Amendment, it is crucial that
the courts work to adopt a uniform standard for balancing the right of publicity
against the freedom of expression. In looking to intellectual property law
assessments for guidance, it is likely courts will be able to more consistently
evaluate both free expression interests and the economic property protection
interests
in
determining
future
right
of
publicity
cases.
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